Minicooper v Pyongyangu?!

Tak to mě podrž...

Severokorejské jaderné zbraně

Moje analýza severokorejského jaderného zbrojení a reakce USA s využitím strategic choice approach.

North Korean Nuclear Weapons
IRCO 410 ~ International Politics and Security

That the U.S., even at its most powerful during the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” was not able to resolve the issue of development of nuclear weapons by North Korea (NK / DPRK), an impoverished Stalinist sanctuary, although it has been trying to do so for 15 years now, presents one of the fascinating puzzles of international politics. It has led to an enormous amount of publications either criticizing the policies used, proposing alternative ones, or both. Given that one of the basic rules of studying politics, be it national or international, is not to take leaders’ stated goals at face value, but to try to uncover their incentives and other plausible reasons for their actions, it is surprising that analysts and commentators of all sorts still take the stated U.S. goal of denuclearization of DPRK for granted. I will argue in this paper that the reason the situation remains unresolved is because it is actually an outcome preferred by the U.S.

I will start my analysis with the military capabilities and information that the two adversaries have. U.S. has immense military (and power projection) capabilities including almost 10 000 nuclear warheads, 11 carrier groups, and over 700 military bases worldwide that allow it to dominate the planet. DPRK has mediocre military capabilities, and no way of projecting power outside its territory, apart from its artillery shelling south of the DMZ, area that includes Seoul (home to almost 50% of SK population) and numerous U.S. military bases.

U.S. can win a war with NK, and it is certain about this outcome. Due to this info, it is also certain NK will not attack it. NK knows it will certainly loose war with the U.S., and therefore, will not attack it or its allies, but is uncertain whether it will be attacked and vanquished by the U.S. Note that the outcome of war doesn’t mean it is costless, indeed later in the paper we will see just how costly U.S. thought it would be. Due to the imbalance in capabilities, U.S. credibly committing itself to not attack DPRK at some time in the future is unsurprisingly one of the NK’s main demands.

NK leadership is one player in the crisis, and it is maximizing staying in power. It was faced with unprecedented crisis in the early 1990s as the Soviet bloc disintegrated and former trade partners turned to West and South Korea (SK) and ceased providing aid and subsidies energy. NK economy went into freefall while its superpower sponsor and protector disappeared, leaving NK with little resources but facing the modern U.S. and SK armies on its border. Moreover, there was the US nuclear weapons advantage, and U.S. has consistently threatened in to use nuclear weapons in NE Asia since the 1940s (Cumings 2003: 15, McCormack 2007b). NK’s strategic choice was one between position of weakness that would only get worse, or developing nuclear weapons that would provide deterrent against U.S. that is more effective and cheaper than conventional forces, and advances NK’s bargaining position in future as well. It chose the second option.

On the U.S. side, the player is the executive, the successive administrations from Clinton in 1993 to Bush since 2001 to Obama now. In 1993, as it became known that NK is working on acquiring nukes, Clinton faced the choice between war and negotiations. War was considered to be extremely costly, the U.S. commander in Korea estimated U.S. causalities to reach 80 – 100 000 dead, with SK military deaths in hundreds of thousands (Cumings 2003:72). Clinton therefore chose negotiations, and a deal was reached to freeze NK’s nuclear program in exchange for fuel oil, civilian nuclear reactors, and security guarantees. Although U.S. promised to give DPRK ‘formal assurances’ that it would not threaten it with nuclear weapons, such assurances were never provided, and moreover, the United States was slow to implement its commitments leading to a great and increasing frustration in the NK (Carpenter 2004: 49, 50; Cumings 2003: 81-2, 87). NK thus decided to defect from the agreement, and secretly pursue HEU nuclear weapons program.

In 2002 this became known to U.S., and U.S. did surprisingly effectively nothing. It refused to negotiate with NK seriously until 2005, and then scuttled the 2005 deal almost immediately and launched financial sanctions (McCormack 2006, 2007b). Even the “landmark” deal reached in February 2007 got quickly mired in the by now usual disagreements about details. If U.S. / Bush’s goal was denuclearization as stated, wouldn’t it have incentives to offer NK a better deal to reach it? A look at Bush’s domestic constituencies, neocons and ballistic missile defense (BMD) lobby, suggests that there were other preferences that U.S. was maximizing.

First are the neocons, who aim for containment of China, and to achieve this want to keep troops in Japan and SK and militarize Japan. Neocons have argued for containing China since 1997, and have pursued this policy since Bush got to power (Chollet and Goldgeier 2008: 175, Klare 2006). The problem they faced was how to legitimize the massive presence of U.S. soldiers in Japan and SK (over 93 000 in 1990, down to 66 000 in 2005) in the face of disappearing threats, given that explicitly stating the mission as containing China was a non option, to the citizens of the two nations and their politicians. U.S. was facing intensifying anti-Americanism and calls for withdrawal of the troops in democratizing Korea (especially since Kim Daejung initiated sunshine policy) and increasingly vocal protests of Okinawans in Japan. Neocons also want a militarized Japan closely allied to U.S., and the propensity of Japanese for pacifism was hindering this. Second, the ballistic missile defense (BMD) lobby, personified by Frank Gaffney, and consisting of assorted Republicans and defense contractors eager to develop missile defense to ensure American hegemony for all, endless profits for some, and as a stepping stone for space based weapons.

For these 3 goals (US presence in East Asia, militarization of Japan, and continuing development
of BMD) the boogeyman of nuclear armed NK is crucial. Scaring population into supporting containment of U.S. geopolitical competitors and the defense spending this requires is a kind of tradition in the U.S. (e.g. bomber gap and missile gap during the Cold War), only this time it is aimed partially at non-US citizens as well. DPRK that pursuing nuclear weapons or is nuclear armed, and seen as irrational and aggressive is the best advertisement for (and assurance of) continuing U.S. troop presence in East Asia. U.S. reaching a deal with NK, and carrying out its obligations, could result in a (partly) denuclearized, less threatening NK, and deprive U.S. of the legitimization of its troops in East Asia, endanger ongoing militarization of Japan, and strip half of the rationale from developing the BMD. It is in the interest of these groups to avoid, delay or scuttle any deal with NK, while keeping the regime intact and seemingly threatening. And that is indeed what we have seen throughout the Bush period. In fact, during the 1996 – 2004 period, US supplied over $1.1 billion worth of aid to NK ($433 million, or 39% of that, under Bush), and gave more food aid to NK than China (CRS 2005: 2, 17), thus helping to keep the Pyongyang regime afloat and playing its boogeyman role. What we have witnessed since 2001 was not a failed policy, but a largely successful one that led to no calls for withdrawal of U.S. forces from East Asia, major changes in Japan’s security doctrine toward militarization, and rapid progress in fielding the BMD system that satisfied Bush’s key constituencies.

How do you think this crisis is likely to evolve during Obama’s first term?
DPRK will not give up its nuclear deterrent, but it is willing to freeze its nuclear program and cease proliferating nuclear and missile technology in exchange for security guarantee from US, normalization of relations including recognition of DPRK, and economic aid. In fact, this was a deal that was offered to U.S. again in October 2002, as Colin Powell admitted in April 2003 (Cumings 2003: 93). Given that U.S. knows that NK will not attack either U.S. or its allies, and unilateral U.S. military action remains prohibitively costly as in the past, it is a deal that Obama is likely to make. Obama will want to achieve an easy foreign policy success, and is not beholden to the neoconservatives and BMD lobby as Bush was. Plus, he should be able to credibly break with the policy of U.S. threats and offer NK the kind of security guarantees it requests.

How do you predict this dispute over nuclear weapons is likely to end? And why?
NK will never give up its nuclear deterrent, but it will not use or share it with terrorists unless attacked, as neither act would enhance its ruler’s, whoever it will be, chances of staying in power. On the contrary, both would be suicidal. U.S. will have to live with a nuclear NK, one way or the other. The optimistic scenario presented above will lead to NK cooperation (given the elite succession rough patch looming ahead for NK, this will be as good a deal as they can get) rather than defection, and U.S. responds in kind resulting in a virtuous circle of increasing trust and cooperation. Few nuclear weapons in their possession will make NK feel safer, while not destabilizing the regional situation if NK is cooperating and engaging with its neighbors in a meaningful way. There is a pessimistic version as well. Not much will change in that one, negotiations with engagement conditional on total denuclearization will continue indefinitely, with a faint hope of a regime collapse. Extremely costly war will not be an option in either case.

References:
Carpenter, Ted Galen, Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, 2004
Chollet, Derek and Goldgeier, James, America Between the Wars: from 11/9 to 9/11, 2008
CRS / Congressional Research Service, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, 2005
Cumings, Bruce, North Korea: Another Country, 2003
Fearon, James D., Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 1995
Hartung, William; Berrigan, Frida; Ciarrocca, Michelle and Wingo, Jonathan, Tangled Web 2005: A Profile of the Missile Defense and Space Weapons Lobbies, World Policy Institute, 2006
Johnson, Chalmers, Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic, 2006
Klare, Michael T., Containing China: The US's real objective, Asia Times online, April 20, 2006
McCormack, Gavan, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace, Verso, 2007a
McCormack, Gavan, North Korea and the Birth Pangs of a New Northeast Asian Order, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 2007b
McCormack, Gavan, North Korea and the US “Strategic Decision, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 2006
Samuels, Richard J., Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 2008
Wayne, Leslie, After High-Pressure Years, Contractors Tone Down Missile Defense Lobbying, NY Times, June 13 2000

Links

I really enjoy Asian Times online economy section, and in fact my decision to sell all my Czech and Chinese stock in late 2007 has a lot to do with reading the analyses there and deciding they are more credible than the BS that was to be read everywhere else about how the crisis will be soon over. My favorit is Julian Desantelis, and his recent piece about Obama's mortgage rescue plan is here.

And one more link, an interesting website of another Russian North Korea expert teaching at ANU

http://www.korea-vision.com/

A picture from his site: A snack kiosk and bicycle repairing station in Ryonggang county near Nampo (2007). A clear evidence of market economy, eh?

Rozhodování v Číně

Z předmětu Chinese politics, aneb jak se staví přehrada v Číně "_"
Včera jsme měli přednášku od japonského člena vedení MMF, kariérního byrokrata který na přelomu devadesátých let a nového tisíciletí řešil na japonském min. financí jejich finanční krizi a byl ředitelem konsolidační agentury. Profesoři ekonomie z IR PS si poctivě dělali poznámky. a vyptávali na detaily. Názor pana Kotegawy byl jednoznačný - Geithnerův plán je zklamáním, čím déle se bude řešení odkládat, tím hůře. Řešení vidí v tuto chvíli v podstatě tři, buď znárodnění bank, anebo (a to byl zajímavý návrh, který jsem slyšel poprvé) povinné zaúčtování ilikvidních aktiv, které banky nechtějí (nebo nemohou, protože by tím zkrachovaly) s velkými ztrátami prodat s nulovou hodnotou s tím, že pokud se někdy v budoucnu prodají zisk zústane bankám. Připomnělo mi to tvrdý postup korejských institucí vůči bankám a firmám, které v doběhu asijské finanční krize musely do určité doby snížit podíly špatných úvěrů a celkové zadluženosti nebo zbankrotovat. Tvrdé byly rovněž tresty které podle pana Kotegawy japonští bankovní manažeři vyfasovali v průběhu restrukturalizace. Třetí možnost byl odkup toxic assets od bank a jejich uskladnění v bad bank.

Bez vyřešení problému bankovního sektoru je podle něj fiskální i peněžní stimulus plýtvání peněz - elegantní tabulka ilustrovala 12 (!) japonských stimulů (spolu s nulovou úrokovou mírou) a nárůst japonského státního dluhu do rekordní výše v průběhu "lost decade."Jinak zmínil ještě nebezpečnou situaci ve východní Evropě. Co dodat - nezbývá než si přát že USA brzy dostanou trochu MMF medicíny, kterou tak rády rozdávaly všem okolo.

Trocha romantiky

Padající hvězda? Nikoliv, jedna z raket odpálená KLDR v létě 2006... něco si přejte.

Stipendia v Busanu

Studujete koreanistiku? Chcete studovat rok v Busanu?

Scholarships at Dongseo University

Dongseo University in Busan, South Korea is offering two one-year scholarships (tuition and board) to North American, European or Australasian undergraduate students of Asian or Korean studies who want to pursue language study.

Applicants should e-mail a CV to Prof. Brian Myers, director of DSU’s Department of International Studies, along with a letter explaining their interest in the scholarship. (E-mail address: brianmyers@hanmail.net)

Students already studying in Korea are ineligible. Non-heritage students of the Korean language are especially encouraged to apply

Kuba a úspěšná organická revoluce

Těžko sledovat tenhle film na vhodnějším místě než v San Diegu, polopoušti kde bez zavlažování roste tak maximálně aloe vera, a bez klimatizace se nedá v létě přežít, a bez ledničky jídlo vydrží sotva den. Prognóza do budoucnosti nevalná.

Wonderful Korea!

Co dělají úředníci v pracovní době

Všude je to stejné. Při práci na projektu o mezinárodní spolupráci pro sledování písečných bouří ve východní Asii jsem se docela pobavil, když jsem v tiskové zprávě korejského ministerstva životního prostředí objevil části něčího (pravděpodobně nebohého úředníka - překladatele do angličtiny) životopisu:

The government also plans developing techniques aimed at countering the dust storms. The National Emergency Management Agency, affiliated with the Ministry of Science and Technology, has begun researching anti-yellow dust storm technologies.

“The agency recently categorized the dust storms as a natural disaster and presented a report on how to counter it,” a KMA official said.

First is first. In order to work effectively, it is important to learn a proper kill of using computer as well as MS word, Excel and most of all, typing in a proper manner. Furthermore my language skill plays a vital role in guiding me to get to my gold however, it is insufficient and I need to make it sufficient. As I said first is first. Therefore a constant and hard work is necessary in developing as well as mastering a language.

The agency would also focus on studying the negative consequences of the accumulated dust on buildings, precision machinery and cultural heritage.

There are several options at this point. It’s either NIER can get next task by getting hired somewhere good such as embassy, large corporation, internship program in English speaking environment or get the ticket to three of nativand.

Zřejmě si to po sobě ani nepřečetl(a), a tak omyl při operaci copy & paste zůstal neodhalen po více než dva roky.

Kdo si sakra myslí že je?

Historka ilustrující Bushův přístup k problémům na Korejském poloostrově:Z David J Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, New York, Public Affairs Press, 2005

Ambasáda v Pyongyangu / mapa

Mapa ambasády ČR. Je v centru, kousek za náměstím Kim Irsena. Popravdě řečeno si nepamatuju kde byla ambasáda ČSSR, ale obchodní oddělení, jestli mě pamět neklame, bylo na opačném břehu řeky.

A ještě jedna novinka z KDLR, Vratné láhve vyhrály Zvláštní cenu poroty na 11. filmovém festivalu, který se konal v Pyongyangu. Publikum je prý přijalo dobře, a to přes velmi omezené informace které Korejci o "Evropském" prostředí mají. Z webu ambasády:

The success of the comedy is particularly noteworthy because of the fact North Koreans´ familiarity with European environment is very limited (for instance, the movie had to be translated as "Empties" since the information about the system of returnable bottles has never reached DPRK).

Já to vždycky tušil!!!

Václav Klaus byl agent! A možná pořád spolupracuje s ruskou rozvědkou, protože mají kopii jeho svazku, jehož zveřejnění by ho absolutně zdiskreditovalo. Můj paranoidní šestý smysl mi říká, že tenhle článek si v českých novinách jen tak nepřečtete, a tak ho repostuji celý. Chlápek co ho napsal existuje, po odchodu z FBI (10 let u kontrašpionáže) napsal knihu Ruse, a článek vyšel v Santa Barbara News-Press loni v prosinci.

DARK SECRET OF NEW EU PRESIDENT

December 20, 2008 12:00 AM

The European Union will have a new president in 12 days. Unfortunately, he was a long-term communist collaborator who may still be under the influence of Russian Intelligence, knowledgeable sources within the intelligence community have told The Investigator.

Vaclav Klaus, 67, is President of the Czech Republic, which will rotate to leadership of the EU on January 1. This is the first time a former Soviet-bloc country will lead the EU -- an irony compounded by Mr. Klaus's opposition, earlier this decade, to Czech membership in the political and economic union of 27 countries and almost 500 million Europeans.

Renowned for his arrogance, the prickly Mr. Klaus is no Santa. Often referred to as Europe's rudest politician, he is more like The Grinch. Such audacious behavior, perhaps, helps him mask a 46 year- old secret.

We can reveal exclusively that Mr. Klaus, while a 21-year-old student at the University of Economics, Prague, in 1962, was recruited by Czech counterintelligence officers and put to work as a spy against democratic reformers with whom he studied and later worked. For five decades he has concealed a murky past of betrayal and deception.

Codenamed "Vodichka," Mr. Klaus is said to have been "an avid and willing informant" who reported on the political reliability of his classmates -- two of whom were expelled because of the information he provided.

For his cooperation, Mr. Klaus was allowed to travel abroad on research projects --first to Italy in 1966, and three years later to Cornell University in Ithaca, N.Y. Mr. Klaus is understood to have reported to Czech intelligence officers on the activities of Czech opposition groups within the United States during the aftermath of the "Prague Spring" rebellion.

In 1970 Mr. Klaus starred in "Operation Rattrap," staged by Czech counterintelligence with the assistance of Soviet KGB advisers. Mr. Klaus was publicly named as an "anti-socialist malcontent" and "purged" from the Economic Institute. Its purpose was to pose Mr. Klaus as a "victim" of the regime so he could continue to penetrate dissident circles as a deep-cover mole. The ruse was successful and Mr. Klaus effectively monitored opposition activities and reported dissident intentions, succeeding also in establishing a personal relationship with underground leader Vaclav Havel, who would become the Czech Republic's first democratically-elected president in 1993.

Mr. Klaus was officially "rehabilitated" by the state in 1987 to allow him to join the Economic Forecasting Institute of the Academy of Sciences -- "a nest of counterrevolution," in the minds of Czech counterintelligence officials, who wanted it infiltrated. Again, Mr. Klaus was their man. Successfully planted within its ranks, he informed on the activities of other members while further building his reputation as a subversive.

But in the 15 years before that, Mr. Klaus had been permitted a career at Czechoslovak State Bank -- most unusual for true critics of the communist regime. He also enjoyed travel privileges, which were practically impossible for genuine dissidents. Mr. Klaus entered politics in 1989 as a member of the Civic Forum party and got appointed Minister of Finance. Three years later he became prime minister.

One of Mr. Klaus's first acts as a state official was to track down the operational file kept on him by Czech counterintelligence -- and shred it. However, unbeknownst to him, a duplicate "Red File" had been dispatched to Moscow, in October 1989, for safekeeping. It remains in the archives of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

Mr. Klaus was instrumental in pushing Civic Forum to the right, and the so-called Klaus-wing of the party became the core of the Civic Democratic Party, which he has led since its founding. In December 1997 Mr. Klaus was forced to resign as prime minister due to complicity in a political funding and corruption scandal stemming from a secret Swiss bank account in his name containing $5 million -- exposed at the time as secret donations in exchange for special favors.

Just over a year later, Mr. Klaus began a series of secret meetings with the SVR's Resident (station chief) in Prague. An SVR officer told The Investigator, "We opened an operational file on Klaus under the codename 'Kolesnikov,' and did not rule out the possibility of a recruitment attempt (on the basis of possessing his file and being privy to his darkest secret)." It is unclear whether Mr. Klaus's political career was resurrected with SVR assistance, but crystal clear that Mr. Klaus has since established an unusually close relationship with Russian supremo Vladimir Putin, who one year ago this month rewarded Mr. Klaus -- a fluent Russian speaker -- with the Pushkin Medal, ostensibly for promoting Russian culture.

Mr. Putin paid a rare state visit to the Czech Republic only after Mr. Klaus succeeded Vaclav Havel as President in 2003. (Mr. Havel led the "Velvet Revolution," which brought freedom to Czechoslovakia). While hosting Mr. Putin, Mr. Klaus' submissive behavior was described by Czech journalists as "borderline sycophancy." Ever since, Mr. Klaus's support for the Putin regime has been strong and unwavering. For example, when the European Union vehemently condemned Russia's invasion of Georgia earlier this year, Mr. Klaus sided with the Kremlin. "The responsibility of Georgia," he declared, "is unexceptionable and fatal."

An active critic of same-sex couples and the green movement, Mr. Klaus has called global warming a "false myth" and referred to Nobel Prize winner Al Gore as "an apostle of arrogance." So no surprise that the Czech president took umbrage last week when the EU sealed a plan to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent. "This is scandalous," he said, upset that French President Nicholas Sarkozy (current EU President) managed to push it through before his term expired. Mr. Klaus had hoped to quash it. "Oh God," proclaimed the Austrian daily newspaper Die Presse in reference to EU leadership, "Vlaclav Klaus will come next."

Indeed. This Euro-skeptic's imminent arrival as EU chieftain bodes not well for European unity -- or the world.

Ambasáda v Pyongyangu

Zůstanu tématicky na poloostrově. Nová budova velvyslanectví ČR v Pyongyangu. Srovnejte s cca. 5x větší budovou velvyslanectví ČSSR na následujících dvou obrázcích. A vedle toho ještě existovalo separátní obchodní odděkení, které bylo také větší než nová ambasáda. Priority se mění, můžeme být rádi že aspoň někde MZV šetří. Mimochodem, vypadá o dost líp než zašlá cihlová ambasáda v Seoulu.

Všechno nejlepší

Kim Jong Il dost možná oslaví svoje narozeniny testem střely Taepodong-2, a tak mě napadlo podívat se na stránky KCNA (KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY of DPRK) jestli se tam o tom něco nedovím. Byla tam narozeninová směs článků - 70% o gratulacích pro "the greatest leader of the present era who is demonstrating the dignity and the national power of the socialist Korea all over the world and is guiding the cause of independence against imperialism to the victory," a 30% o skupině zrádců v čele s Lee Myungbakem a jejich aktuálních podlých aktivitách. O testu tam nebylo nic, zato jsem se ale dozvěděl že někteří zastánci pokroku a juche se vyskytují i u nás:

Exploits of Kim Jong Il Praised in Various Countries

Pyongyang, February 13 (KCNA) -- A seminar was held in France, round-table talks in the Czech Republic and a lecture in Mongolia on February 4 on the occasion of the birthday of General Secretary Kim Jong Il.

...

The deputy general secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party at the round-table talks noted that Kim Jong Il has performed immortal exploits in the efforts for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country, true to the last instructions for national reunification of Kim Il Sung, eternal President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

He said that the Czechoslovak Communist Party expresses full support to the Korean people in their efforts to defend socialism and reunify the country.

DPRK's Principled Stand Hailed in Czech Republic

Pyongyang, February 13 (KCNA) -- The Paektusan Czech-Korean Friendship Association and the Czech Group for the Study and Materialization of the Juche Idea fully supported the statements issued by a spokesman for the General Staff of the Korean People's Army and the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea.

The organizations in their joint statement on Feb. 5 said that the situation is getting tenser day by day on the Korean Peninsula where the atmosphere of national reconciliation and unity had been prevalent and this is arousing serious concern from among the international community aspiring after Korea's reunification.

They bitterly denounced the Lee Myung Bak group's policy of confrontation with the DPRK and expressed full support for the statements of a spokesman for the General Staff of the Korean People's Army and the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea that clarified the DPRK's principled stand to crush such policy.

They strongly urged the south Korean authorities to stop the military provocative moves against the DPRK at once, respect the June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration and make a radical switchover in their policy for Korea's reunification.

K jednoznačnému odmítnutí Lee Myungbakovy konfrontační politiky se samozřejmě připojuji, a taky přeji Kimovi všechno nejlepší, hlavně aby Taepodong tentokrát nevybuchl minutu po startu jako minule.

Sněží!!

Stonewall peak, 1747 m.n.m

Po cestě na vrchol začalo notně sněžit, tak jsme se kousek před vrcholem rozhodli vrátit. Většina parku Cuyamaca Rancho lehla před pár lety popelem, panoramická vyhlídka z vrcholku před požárem vypadala takhle.

Melancholická krajina v okolí JulianV obležení automobilovými mastodonty

Tentokrát jsem dostal americké přibližovadlo. O kvalitě motoru a převodovky svědčí fakt, že pod 10l na 100km jsem se nedostal ani při jízdě 90kou po okreskách, a to to byl 4válec se 145hp. Podvozek shodný s Opel Astra ale dopomohl k tomu že jízda po horských zákrutách byla docela legrace.

Children of men

Jednoznačně nejlepší sci-fi film od Blade Runnera, skvěle natočený, s výborným scénářem a Michaelem Cainem. Vůbec nechápu jak jsem ho mohl propásnout v kinech. Vlastně jo, v roce 2006 jsem byl fugee v Irsku. Víc info na childrenofmen.net

Jak nezvýšit chuť k jídlu

Jedna z věcí kterou Lim měla na svém seznamu "udělat v Americe" byla návštěva In'n'out burgers, kde mimochodem servírují opravdu fajn cheeseburgery, a potom Cheesecake factory. Tam mě u vchodu zarazila tahle cedulka:Nevím jak vám, ale mě to apetyt jaksi nepovzbudilo, a tak jsem zůstal u jediného kousku dortu. Byl s karamelem a pecan nuts a docela dobrý, ale jako drtivá většina místních dobrot příšerně přeslazený.

Carlsbad on the sea

Carlsbad - přímořské město 30km na sever od La Jolla. Začátky byly skromné - zastávka na znamení na California Southern Railroad. Někdy po roce 1880 ale kapitán John Frazier při kopání studny pro vodu na doplňování nádrží parních lokomotiv narazil na zdroj minerální vody, která se po rozboru ukázala jako identická složením s karlovarkou minerálkou, a osada do té doby známá jako Frazier's station byla překřtěna na Carlsbad.

Socha kpt. FrazieraSocha byla darována starostou Varů

Zimní poušť

Anza-Borrego park. Kromě smrti žízní cedule varují i před mountain lions a poradí jak na ně - nekrčit se, ale naopak rozpřáhnout ruce anebo jim natáhnout přes tlamu holí.

(1-p)=válka

Přiznám se, že takhle jsem si studium mezinárodních vztahů nepředstavoval. Zatracená matematika infiltrovala už snad každou společenskou vědu...

Manchukuo

Originální japonský plakát ze 30.let zacílený na kritiky Mandžuska z anglicky mluvících zemí

California republic

Geisel library, centrum UCSD

Hehe

Výlet do LA

Skvělé počasí, korejské přibližovadlo s 200hp V6, děsivé centrum LA, brzo na kutě, snídaně v Hollywoodu, pláž v Santa Monice plná Korejců, výšlap na kopec v Leo Camarillo park, hlad a žízeň, kilo BBQ baby ribs a Guinness, brzo na kutě, molo s rybařícími bezdomovci a historické centrum ve Ventuře, cesta zpět do SD přes Thousand Oaks Wildwood park.