Monday 14 July 2008

Stalin Gottwaldovi o Korejské válce

Právě jsem se v novinách Korea Herald dočetl o nedávno (zřejmě 2005) objeveném dopise, ve kterém Stalin vysvětluje Gottwaldovi proč se SSSR nezúčastnil hlasování v RB OSN a umožnil tak vojenskou intervenci USA pod hlavičkou OSN. Dopis je datován 27.8.1950, tj. 2 měsíce po vypuknutí války. Anglický překlad dopisu:
Top Secret

Prague, Soviet Ambassador
Please pass on to Gottwald verbally the following message. Contact him by post if he so requests.
“We view the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from the Security Council on 27 June and the subsequent events somewhat differently from comrade Gottwald.
We left the Security Council for four reasons: first, to demonstrate solidarity of the Soviet Union towards the new China. Second, to underscore the foolishness and idiocy of the United States policy seeking the appointment of a Guomindang clown as the China’s representative to the Security Council; third, to render the decision of the Security Council unlawful as a result of representatives of two great powers missing; fourth, to give American government a free hand to gain the majority vote in the Security Council, make more mistakes, and show its true colors to the public.
I believe that we have achieved all of these goals.
Following our withdrawal form the Security Council, America has become entangled in the military intervention in Korea and is now wasting away its military prestige and moral authority. Few honest people can now doubt the fact that America acts as an aggressor and tyrant in Korea and that, in military terms, it is really not as powerful as it claims to be. Besides, it is clear that the United States of America is presently diverted from Europe and the Far East. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? It surely does.

Let us suppose that American government will continue to be involved in the Far East and will also pull China into the struggle for the liberation of Korea and its own independence. What could come out of this?

First, America, just like any other state, cannot deal with China, a country with such large military capacity. It turns out that America would break its neck in this struggle. Second, having failed in this respect, America would not be in a position to partake in a third world war.[1] Therefore, the third world war would be postponed for an unspecified period, giving enough time to strengthen socialism in Europe. Moreover, the struggle between America and China would put the entire Far East in a state of revolution. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? It surely does.

As you can see, the question of whether or not the Soviet Union should be a member of the Security Council is not as simple as it might seem.
Thus, we cannot say that the “camp of democracy[2] has no need to leave the Security Council.” Whether we leave or stay depends on the circumstances. We might leave the Security Council again and come back once again, depending on what the international situation is like.
One might inquire why we have returned to the Security Council. We have returned to continue exposing the aggressive policy of American government and to prevent it from using the Security Council as a cover-up for its aggression. Now that America has become aggressively involved in Korea, it would be easier to pursue this goal while remaining a member of the Security Council. I think that this point is sufficiently clear and needs no further explanation.

FILIPPOV.
27 August 1950

Source: RGASPI. Font . 558, Opis. 11, Delo. 62, Listy. 71-72
[1] Translator’s note: The author’s intention is ambiguous in this sentence for lack of a precise verb. It could be understood to convey the following meanings: America would not be prepared for a third world war; America would not be ready to trigger a third world war; America would not favor the beginning of a third world war
[2] Translator’s note: Translation here is literal from lager demokratiyi.

2 comments:

Vojta said...

Zajímavé. Zpětně hodnoceno podle historiků to byla ale chyba jako kráva a taky už to nikdy neudělali. Co si o tom myslíš ty?

Part said...

Zpětně hodnoceno ano, ale Stalin tehdy viděl třetí světovou válku za každým rohem, a poštvat proti sobě USA a čínské komunisty (kteří po letech občanské války měli sjednocení Číny na dosah) pro něj byl velký úspěch. Těžko plánoval na 20 nebo 50 let dopředu...

Je fakt že Kimův útok a jeho následné označení za "útok monolitického komunistického bloku na asijské frontě" umožnil Trumanovi snadněji "prodat" závody ve zbrojení se SSSR, tak jak je plánoval NSC-68 (duben 1950), veřejnosti a Kongresu, ale americká administrativa se tímhle směrem chtěla vydat už před vypuknutím korejské války.